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Article

EDUCATION, AUTONOMY AND CIVIC VIRTUE
Richard D<Jgger

Article Summary: The major cause of our crisis in education is lack of agreement on the
purpose of education. We can agree on what that purpose is, Richard Dagger argues. if
we define it as the promotion of autonomy and civic virtue. Autonomy and civic virtue
are often taken to be incompatible because one has to do with individual liberty and the
other with collective responsibility. Dagger shows that the charge of incompatibility
does not hold up under analysis. The two terms are, rather, complementary.

Almost everyone agrees that we face an educational
crisis in the United States today. There is less agreement,
however, on the exact nature of the crisis and the proper
response to it. This lack of agreement is itself significant,
for the failure to agree on what we want our schools to do
is largely responsible for the problems we now face. In the
absence of such an agreement, we simply expect our
schools to meet the demands of everyone vocal enough to
make himself or herself heard. The result, according to
John Chubb and Terry Moe, the authors of a recent and
controversial book on America's schools, is that public
schools "must make everyone happy by being all things to
all people - just as politicians do (Politics, Markets and
America's Schools, p. 54).
If this is so, then what is to be done? Logically, there are
only two alternatives to the present condition. The first is
to try to find or forge a consensus on the proper purpose of
education, then direct our schools to pursue that purpose.
The second, abandoning hope of achieving this consensus,
is to allow schools to define their own purposes by encouraging competition between a variety of schools pursuing a variety of goals. This is the point of the so-called
choice approach advocated most recently by Chubb and
Moe. As they see it, "schools have no immutable or transcendent purpose. What they are supposed to be doing
depends on who controls them and what these controllers
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want them to do" (p. 30.) The solution, then, is to free individual schools to pursue whatever goals they deem appropriate, thereby freeing parents and students to choose
the schools most congenial to their inclinations. Schools
should have to compete for customers in the marketplace,
in other words, and successful schools, like successful
magazines, will find "their niche - a specialized segment
of the market to which they can appeal and attract support" (p. 55).
There may be much to recommend this approach to education. It is only in its most extreme form, however, that
educational "choice" escapes the need to arrive at some sort
of agreement about the purpose of education. In Chubb
and Moe's proposal, for instance, schools will have to
meet certain standards - for teacher certification, graduation requirements, and nondiscrimination, among others
- if they are to qualify for the public funds that follow
students to the schools they and their parents choose. At
some point, then, some public decision will have to be
reached about what schools must and must not do. Even
"voucher" proposals encounter this problem, for without
some standards to determine what counts as an honest-togoodness school, anyone who teaches anything could
have a claim on the public funds supporting the vouchers.
The only way to escape this difficulty is to adopt an extreme libertarian position and call for either anarchy or
Robert Nozick's "minimal state," in which there will be
neither public funding, nor public schools, nor any requirement that anyone see to the education of children.
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If we do not want to follow the market mentality all the
way to anarchy or the minimal state, we shall have to face
up to the task of forging an agreement on the purposes of
education - or, more narrowly, of what we want our
schools to do. This, to be sure, is no easy task in a society
as diverse as ours; but neither is it an impossible one.
There are educational goals, albeit quite general ones, on
which we can and should agree. This is evident in the
distinction we now draw implicitly between various
specialized schools - business schools, dance schools,
schools of broadcasting, and so on - and our schools
simpliciter. The purpose of the latter is not to prepare people for a specific career or activity, but in some way to
prepare them for life. There is a difference, in other words,
between training, which is the business of the specialized
school, and education, which is the business of the school
as such.
These distinctions suggest that the task of reaching a
consensus on the goals of our schools is not hopeless. Unfortunately, they do not take us very far toward accomplishing that task. One may doubt, for instance, that
there is any great insight in the. observation that the
business of the school is to educate. Even if we add that the
purpose of education is in some way to prepare people for
life, we still have to reach agreement on what "preparing
people for life" entails. Given the variety of views in this
country about how life should be lived, it is not easy to see
how this can be done. My suggestion, however, is that we
ought to think of preparation for life in terms of autonomy
and civic virtue.
It is often alleged that autonomy and. civic virtue are
competing, or even incompatible, goods. Any steps we
take to promote autonomy will come at the expense of
civic virtue, according to this view, and vice versa. To ask
schools to promote both, then, is to ask the impossible. In
this essay I argue that autonomy and civic virtue, properly
understood, are not incompatible, but complementary
goals. I further suggest that autonomy and civic virtue
provide better goals for our schools and our children than
the competitive model so often favored by civic and business leaders.
Autonomy and Civic Virtue: Complementary Goals
Autonomy and civic virtue are often taken to be incompatible with one another because one has to do with individual liberty, the other with collective responsibility.
Autonomy requires people to look inward so that they
may govern themselves, while civic virtue demands that
they look outward and do what they can to promote the
common good. The two concepts also seem to be at home
in different traditions of political thought, or different
forms of political discourse. Autonomy has been the concern of liberals, on this view, while civic virtue has occupied the attention of classical republicans and communitarians. Thus "autonomy" seems to be a key term in
the "rights-talk" of liberal theorists, and "civic virtue" a key
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term in a different vocabulary that centers on virtue.
Autonomy and civic virtue are different from one
another, of course; if they were identical, we presumably·
would have no need for one of the two concepts. But this
hardly proves them to be incompatible goods. The connection between autonomy and liberalism, on the one
hand, and civic virtue and republican or communitarian
views, on the other, is not as strict or necessary as it may
seem. Some liberal writers, such as John Stuart Mill and
T.H. Green, seem to want to encourage civic virtue, even
if they do not use the term. There are also writers of a
republican bent, such as Rousseau, who are clearly concerned with what we now call autonomy. I do not believe,
then, that we must consign autonomy and civic virtue to
distinct and incommensurable political traditions or
"discourses" as necessarily incompatible terms. On the
contrary, I believe that the two concepts exercise considerable appeal today precisely because they indicate
what is of value in these two, not altogether distinct, traditions of political thought. Rather than regard autonomy as
a purely individualist notion and civic virtue as a collectivist or communitarian ideal, we should look to their
union as part of what Charles Taylor has called holist individualism, "a trend of thought that is fully aware of the
(ontological) social embedding of human agents, but at the
same time prizes liberty and individual differences very
highly" ("Cross Purposes," in Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed.,
Liberalism and the Moral Life, p. 163). With that in mind,
let us now take a closer look at the concepts in question.
Autonomy as Self-Mastery
Because autonomy is something we may predicate of a
number of things - nation-states, corporations, and
sewer districts, among them - it is necessary to be clear
that my concern here is with the autonomy of the individual person. This is particularly important in view of
the tendency of some writers on education to use "autonomy" in the sense of a school's independence, or freedom
from interference. There is nothing wrong with this usage,
but it must not be confused with personal autonomy.
The starting point is much the same, however. Whether
we are referring to persons, schools, or nation-states, the
literal meaning of 'autonomy' is still self-rule, selflegislation, or self-government. The difficulty, of course,
lies in determining what is involved in self-rule. But we
may begin by noting that autonomy assumes a self that is
capable of leading a self-governed life.
At the conceptual core of autonomy is the notion of a
self as a distinct person. Someone who cannot distinguish
himself or herself from others cannot possibly lead a selfgoverned life, for such a person cannot conceive of himself
or herself as a person with a distinct identity; nor can someone who suffers from some form of multiple or divided
personalities. Autonomy implies, then, some fairly strong
sense of selfhood - a sense that we do not expect infants

to possess, but that we usually hope children will develop
as they mature.

If autonomy requires a fairly strong sense of self, it also
requires that the self be capable of making choices. A person is self-legislating, autonomous rather than heteronomous, to the extent that she chooses the principles by
which she lives. But if she truly chooses the principles that
guide her conduct, the autonomous person must be aware
of the alternatives from which she can choose. Someone
who does the right thing instinctively, without reflection,
in the manner of Melville's Billy Budd, may be a good and
decent person, but not an autonomous one. Autonomy requires awareness: awareness of the choices open to us in
life, and awareness also of our capacity to choose. If we
can lead self-governed lives, then, it is because we are able
to think of ourselves as more than objects at the mercy of

forces over which we have no control, like so many leaves
tossed about by the wind.
Because these forces may be internal as well as external
autonomy is sometimes regarded as self-mastery. Thi~
raises interesting and difficult problems, for it may be
taken to mean that the self is not a single thing - or even
that a person consists of more than one self. Sometimes
people speak of a "lower" or "base" self, which leads us into
temptation, and to which they oppose a "higher" or "true"
self that struggles to keep us on the straight and narrow
yath. The autonomous person, on this view, is the one
who achieves self-mastery by suppressing the impulses of
the lower self in order to follow the inclinations of the
higher.
To think in this way, however, is to misconceive auton~

omy. It misconceives autonomy because it leads to selfdenial, perhaps even self-destruction. On this view, in
other words, self-mastery is much like the relationship between master and slave, with the higher self, usually conceived to be reason or soul, called upon to exercise strict
control over the lower, usually understood as appetite or
flesh. But appetite or flesh, with all its insistent impulses, is
natural to human beings, so the attempt to rise above and
master it - and thus to divorce the "true" self from that
'1ower" self rooted in nature - is necessarily a form of selfdenial. If we accomplish this denial, what is left? Pure
reason or soul, all form and no content.
What is the alternative? Do we want to say that the person who acts on every fleeting impulse is autonomous?
No, for there is a point to the distinction between

autonomy and heteronomy; but it is a point that can be
captured in a conception of autonomy that does not require a divided, contentious self. If the model of a
heteronomous person is a creature of impulse, incapable
of deferring gratification or exercising any control over his
or her appetites, the model of the autonomous person is
one who knows these appetites and inclinations (among
other things) well enough to bring them into harmony,
and thus to achieve integrity through their integration.
This comes closer to self-realization than to self-denial. If it
involves self-mastery, it is the craftsman's mastery of a
craft - the mastery of an orchestra conductor, for instance, or of the football quarterback who directs his
teammates toward their goal - and not the mastery of the
slaveowner. If autonomy is self-mastery, in short, it is
mastery of self, not mastery over self.
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Civic Virtue and Citizenship
Unlike personal autonomy, which relates to the abstract
notion of the self, civic virtue refers to a particular role
that a person may occupy - the role of citizen. Someone
exhibits civic virtue, that is, when he or she does what a
citizen is supposed to do. In this respect civic virtue is like
the other virtues, which typically related to the performance of some role or the exercise of a certain skill.
Our concept of virtue derives from the Greek arete, or
excellence, by way of the Latin virtus, which carried from
its association with vir (man) the additional connotations
of strength and boldness. To be virtuous, then, was to exhibit excellence in a particular skill or craft, or to perform
admirably in a particular role or occupation. It was also
possible to display a more general form of virtue by manifesting to a high degree the qualities of a good person. This
was (and is) possible, however, only when there was (and
is) some fairly dear notion of what a person is supposed to
be. Personhood, in other words, must be conceived as a
role that one may play, complete with criteria for determining when one is playing the role properly. In this sense
a virtuous person is like a virtuoso musician, someone
who does with great skill what a musician is supposed to
do.
This suggests that there is a conceptual connection between the ideas of virtue and of good. Just as it would be
absurd to say that Jones is a virtuoso pianist, but not a
good one, so it would be absurd to say that Smith is a virtuous person, but not a good one. Such a connection does
not hold between the ideas of autonomy and of good. We
may think that autonomy itself is good, but we need not
contradict ourselves when we say that Adams is an autonomous person, but not, all things considered, a good one.
As a role-related concept, then, virtue refers to the
disposition to act in accordance with the standards and expectations that define the role or roles a person performs.
The more specific the role, the more specific the virtues
associated with it will be. A steady hand may be among
the virtues of a carpenter and a surgeon, for instance, but
not of an accountant or poet. There are some character
traits or dispositions that seem useful to almost everyone,
however, and these are what we sometimes think of as "the
virtues" - including the classical virtues of wisdom,
courage, temperance, and justice, or a sense of proportion. These are virtues - along with honesty, loyalty,
compassion, and others - not so much because they work
to the advantage of the person who possesses them, but
because they work to the advantage of the people with
whom he or she associates. Virtues are valuable because
they promote the good of the community or society, not
because they directly promote the good of the individual
person. This may be why chastity, which no longer seems
so vital to the welfare of society, may be less widely
regarded as a virtue than once it was.
To be virtuous, then, is to perform well a socially
necessary or important role. This does not mean that the
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virtuous person must always go along with the prevailing
views or attitudes. On the contrary, Socrates and John
Stuart Mill have persuaded many people to believe that
questioning and opposing the prevailing views are among
the highest forms of virtue. In making this case, however,
they rely on the claim that the social gadfly and the unorthodox thinker are really promoting the long-run interests
of society - and thereby performing a social role of exceptional value.
Even if it might be shown that some virtues have no social value at all, it is clear that civic virtue will not be
among them. Civic virtue simply is the disposition to do
what is best for one's community, and to do it even - or
especially ~ when one's private interest seems to point in a
different direction. Understood in this way, civic virtue
was a key concept of the classical republicans, and it survives today in the exhortations to do one's civic duty that
regularly appear at election time. The fear of corruption
and conflicts of interest also betray its traces. There are
signs of a revival of a more straightforward appeal to civic
virtue in the writings of various republican or communitarian theorists, of course, and even some who identify
themselves with liberalism are showing an open interest in
civic virtue of some sort. So there is reason to believe that a
brief examination of the classical republicans' conception
of civic virtue is worthwhile.
There appear to be three basic elements in civic virtue as
the classical republican writers understood it. The first is
the fear of corruption. Corruption is the opposite of virtue, for it consists in shirking one's duty as a citizen. This
could take the passive form of neglecting one's civic duties
in favor of one's personal pleasures, such as indolence or
the pursuit of luxury; or it could take the active form of advancing one's personal interests at the expense of the common good. This was most likely to happen when ambition
and avarice, the desire for power and wealth, would tempt
a citizen to overthrow the rule of law and install a tyranny
in its place.
The second key ingredient in the classical republicans'
conception of civic virtue is fear of dependence. They
regarded the citizen, following Aristotle, as someone who
rules and is ruled in turn. The person who is completely
dependent on another may be ruled, but is in no position
to rule. The rule of law is essential, therefore, as a means of
avoiding personal dependence. In a government of laws,
not of men, the citizen is subject to the laws, not to the
demands and whims of rulers who act without restraint.
The republicans also typically defended private property
as a way of guaranteeing that the citizen would not be
dependent on others for his livelihood. Some, notably
James Harrington and Rousseau, went further, suggesting
that private property should be maintained, but distributed in such a way as to prevent anyone from being so
wealthy as to render other citizens dependent. As
Rousseau put the point in the Social Contract (Book I,

Chapter 9), everyone should have something, but no one
too much.
ll
h .
The fear of dependence indicates, fina y, t e importance of independence, or liberty, in the republicans' conception of civic virtue. The virtuous citizen must be free,
but not simply free to go his own way. This may be a form
of freedom, but it is not a form of citizenship as they
understood it. The citizen is free, they held, when he participates in the government of his community. As part of
the community, the citizen will recognize that the government of common affairs is more or less directly selfgovernment. If it requires the occasional sacrifice of one's
persona.I interests, so be it; for this is necessary not only in
the name of civic duty, but also in order to enjoy the rights
and liberties of the citizen in a self-governing polity.
This, then, is what civic virtue was - and what it still is,
according to those theorists who want to revive the republican spirit in contemporary politics. The question we
must now consider is whether the revival of civic virtue is
compatible with the desire for personal autonomy. I
believe that it is. More than that, I believe that the three
elements of the classical republicans' conception of civic
virtue can help us see how the two may effectively complement one another.
Personal Autonomy and Civic Virtue
The autonomous person chooses the principles by
which he or she will live, which implies some degree of
critical reflection on the principles available. With civic
virtue, however, the emphasis is not on choice, but on acting, perhaps without reflection, to promote the common
good. The unquestioning soldier who makes the "ultimate
sacrifice" for his or her country provides a good example.
It is easy enough to see, then, how autonomy and civic virtue can seem to be at odds with one another, for it is certainly possible for someone to exhibit civic virtue without
being autonomous, just as it is possible for an autonomous
person to put his or her well-being above the interests of
anyone or anything else.
But this is to say that personal autonomy and civic virtue are different from one another, not that they are incompatible. It is also possible that their differences are
complementary. To be precise, it is possible that autonomy and civic virtue, properly understood, are related concepts that can and should complement one another.
Another look at the three principal elements of the
classical republicans' conception of civic virtue should
begin to make this clear.
First, the republicans' fear of corruption is largely a fear
of human weakness. Indolence and love of luxury, ambition and avarice - these vices constantly beckon people
to forsake their civic duties and disregard the claims of the
common good. The threat of corruption is graver at some
times than others, they believed, but it is always a threat.
To stave it off it is necessary to establish mixed government and the rule of law, perhaps even to rotate public offices among the citizenry and to prevent the concentration

of wealth and property in the hands of a few. But these
devices will never extirpate the threat, for it springs from
selfish and ultimately self-defeating desires implanted in
human nature. To hold them in check while directing people's attention and devotion to the common good is,
therefore, to achieve a form of self-mastery. In this
respect, civic virtue and autonomy have something in
common.
This is true with regard to the second feature of civic virtue as well. In this case the republicans' distinction between dependence and independence has a direct counterpart in the distinction between heteronomy and autonomy. The connection is probably clearest in the works of
Rousseau, a republican writer who inspired the
philosopher most often identified with the distinction between autonomy and heteronomy - Immanuel Kant.
Rousseau proclaims that the only way to overcome
"dependence on men" - and thus to promote freedom - is

•
•
•••• •
••••••
• ••
to rely on the impartial rule of law and the general will.
The general will, moreover, is not some disembodied force
that resides in the community as a whole. Instead, it is the
will that every citizen has as a citizen - the will to act in
the public interest because that is the one interest all
citizens share as citizens. If the rule of law frees people
from their dependence on others, then, they will be free to
make laws in accordance with the general will that each
one shares. This, as Rousseau puts it in the Social Contract
(Book I, Chapter 8), is "moral liberty," that is, living in accordance with laws that one makes for oneself. Another
name for this is autonomy.
The connection between autonomy and civic virtue is
perhaps most obvious with regard to the third element of
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civic virtue - the idea that liberty is participation in
government, and therefore self-government. Since autonomy means "self-government," one might say that the concept of civic virtue entails a commitment to autonomy, in
some sense of the word. Again, this commitment is probably clearest in Rousseau's writings. For Rousseau, in
fact, it seems not only that civic virtue entails selfgovernment, but that autonomy is possible only when
civic virtue prevails. For unless the general will of the
citizen takes precedence over the particular will of the
man, in Rousseau's terms, no one can experience moral
liberty.
From the perspective of the classical republican conception of civic virtue, in short, autonomy and civic virtue are
far from incompatible ideals. The same result emerges
from a further analysis of the concept of autonomy. To begin with, autonomy "has to be worked for," which leads
Robert Young (Personal Autonomy, p. 9) and other philosophers to regard it as "a character ideal or virtue. "More to
the point, autonomy is not something that one can achieve
solely through individual effort. It has to be worked for,
certainly, but it also has to be cultivated or developed. An
infant may have the ability to lead a self-governed life
within her, like a seed, but this ability must be nourished
and developed by others before she can ever hope to be
autonomous. Recognizing this, the autonomous person
should also recognize a duty of some sort to those whose
help has made and continues to make it possible for her to
lead a reasonably self-governed life. In a country or community in which this help sometimes takes the form of
more or less impersonal public assistance or cooperation,
the corresponding duty is a civic duty. Thus the
autonomous person has a reason to exhibit civic virtue, at
least when the community as a whole plays a significant
part in fostering personal autonomy.
Conclusion
Bringing an end to the educational crisis in the United
States requires a clear sense of the purpose or purposes of
education. We can agree on what that purpose is, I have
said, if we define it broadly as the promotion of autonomy
and civic virtue. With these goals in mind, we can begin to
discuss more productively the particular steps that need to
be taken to improve our schools. Autonomy and civic virtue will not tell us everything we need to know on these
matters - they will not help us to choose between phonics
and its rivals as a method of teaching reading, for instance

16 The Civw Arts Review

- but they can provide points of orientation from which
people of diverse views can take their bearings.
Now I want to conclude by indicating why I believe my
approach is superior to what seems, judging from the
statements of civic and business leaders, to be its chief rival
- the view that the purpose of education is to prepare our
children, and thus our country, for economic competition.
There are three reasons why I think it is better to take
autonomy and civic virtue as our goals. The first is that an
education for autonomy and civic virtue will give as much
time and attention to the basic skills as the competitive
model, thus promising to accomplish what the competitive model wants to accomplish. Second, the approach I
have defended is more comprehensive and accommodating than the competitive model. It can help to prepare
children for competition, that is, but it will also give them
a wider vision, thereby offering an opportunity for growth
to those who decide, upon reflection, that the competitive
life is not the life they want to lead. It should also prove
valuable in helping students to become adaptable - a trait
that is supposed to be increasingly important in a world of
"career burnout" and rapid change.
Finally, the competitive model points in two
undesirable directions. On the one hand, it encourages us
to think of children as resources to be marshalled in the
struggle to maintain our national economic strength. On
the other, it leads children to see themselves as isolated individuals locked in competition with one another - competition for jobs, money, and status. Thus the competitive
model points either in a collectivist or an intensely individualist direction. In the first case it devalues the individual, who becomes a mere resource; in the second it
affords little hope of maintaining social bonds and
loyalties. In the first case it denies autonomy; in the second, civic virtue. Neither of these is acceptable.
With autonomy and civic virtue, however, we have the
basis for an education grounded in holist individualism.
Such an education proceeds from the view that no one is a
self-created person, yet almost everyone has the capacity
to exercise a considerable degree of control over his or her
life. This capacity ought to be developed, furthermore, for
it is a vital part of a worthwhile life; and a society that encourages the development of this capacity deserves the
support of those it helps in this way. Autonomy and civic
virtue are not, on this view, incompatible goods, but two
sides of the same conception of the relationship between
individuals and the political order. o

